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ABSTRACT. Population, employment and economic capac-
ity continue to concentrate in and around large urban centres.
If geography (measured as proximity to large centres of popu-
lation) increasingly matters in the knowledge economy, then
there may be no future for periphery locations. This paper
critically reviews and refutes this hypothesis by looking at the
world’s small islands. Handicapped by size and distance, they
are unable to generate scale dynamics nor to regularly access
any neighbouring, large metropolitan centres. Nevertheless,
jurisdictional resourcefulness resulting from sovereignty or sub-
national autonomy fosters compensatory policy capacity.
Demand for niche-technology manufactures and craft-based,
labour-intensive or place-speciﬁc services is likely to persist.
Cyclical migration strategies allow islanders seeking work or
education oﬀ island to tap the metropole and re-inject resources
to reinvigorate the periphery. Remittances, aid, bureaucracy
and other ‘‘rents’’ can provide signiﬁcant ﬁscal resources nec-
essary for survival.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between cities and urban econo-
mies is becoming increasingly more important
than the relationship between countries. Popula-
tion, employment and economic capacity continue
to concentrate in and around large urban centres.
Globalisation and global competitive trends are
leading to the greater concentration of resources
associated with the modern economy (high-tech
industries, ﬂexible IT-skilled labour pools, re-
search and development institutes, ICT-specializ-
ing universities) in large urban centres and
metropolitan areas. This trend suggests that new
technologies are not altering a pattern of concen-
tration ushered in by industrialisation; but are
actually helping to fuel it. It appears that geogra-
phy (measured as proximity to large centres of
population) increasingly matters in the knowledge
economy; while contemporary success (measured
in terms of economic viability) is synonymous with
being a successful knowledge economy. ‘‘The
world, economically and in management terms,
has become a network of ... prosperous city-
regions’’ (Ohmae, 2001, p. 33).
The implications of such an assessment spell the
demise of periphery locations. Any location that is
unable to muster a signiﬁcant knowledge critical
mass will ﬁnd itself exporting people, brains,
investment and other forms of capital to attractive
metropolitan zones or their immediate suburbs.
Employment opportunities will fall; actual entre-
preneurs will move away; potential ones will look
askance. The young and educated people will relo-
cate ﬁrst, often never to return but to visit relatives
and friends. A decreasing population reduces the
political clout of the peripheral community, making
the resort to political solutions to the adverse con-
dition less likely; while the availability of state-
of-the-art, public infrastructure (as in roads, health
care, education) also declines.
This dynamic appears irreversible. It is borne
out by demographic statistics, concentration of
knowledge industries and investment ﬂows. Are
therefore all peripheries meant to suﬀer, sooner or
later, a haemorrhage of human and other, eco-
nomic resources? Is such a demographic shift
laudable both from an economies of scale
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perspective, as well as with regard to the improved
quality of life of the beneﬁciaries?
This paper seeks insights towards answering this
fundamental question by looking at extreme,
peripheral locations. In so doing, it adopts a meth-
odological approach recommended byWrightMills
(1959, p. 207), whereby the investigation of extreme
and opposite case scenarios can facilitate a bettering
understandingof speciﬁc trends.These locations are
small islands: structurally cheated of economies of
scale and institutional ‘‘thickness’’ (after Amin and
Thrift, 1994, pp. 14–15) as well as burdenedwith the
double handicap of insularity and distance from
more heavily populated mainlands, where metro-
politan centres are invariably located. They are
amongst themost poorly equipped to respond to the
challenges of the technological age. How are small
islands faring in aworld that favours big cities?How
can they hope to muster the resources to become
knowledge economies? How well do small islands
—often, by deﬁnition, peripheral regions—provide
interesting lessons in the political economy of re-
gional development?
Answers to these questions should reveal the
extent to which: ‘‘success’’ today is co-terminous
with knowledge capitalisation; how far does dis-
tance impede development; and how uni-dimen-
sional the deﬁnition of ‘‘development’’ is meant
to be.
2. An integrating global economy; a splintering
global polity
The recent dominant trend in world economics has
been the dismantling of trade barriers and the
increasingly seamless freedom of movement of
people, money, goods and services across borders.
In such a context, capital and skills associated with
the knowledge economy have been concentrating
with a spectacular speed. The sprawl of metro-
politan areas embracing leading-edge players spells
an increasing rate of decline for peripheral regions,
with their members on one hand increasingly
thwarted of the opportunities associated with the
knowledge economy; while, on the other hand,
increasingly able, willing or obliged to migrate.
People, like capital, tend to be drawn from
periphery to core.
Meanwhile, and in apparent contrast, a domi-
nant trend in world politics over recent decades
has been for countries to grow smaller rather than
larger, by fracturing along national and ethnic
lines. Drucker (1986) refers to this phenomenon as
the intriguing coincidence of an integrating global
economy and a splintering global polity. Thus the
number of sovereign states in the world has
increased almost fourfold (from 52 to 195) since
1945; while sub-national regions demand, and of-
ten obtain, increasing jurisdictional autonomy.
Amongst these, islands stand out in particular for
being geographically disposed towards being dis-
crete administrative units, and for having suc-
cessfully carved out a stable political status, which
assures autonomy without sovereignty. There are
32 sovereign island and archipelagic states today;
and over 100 sub-national, autonomous, island
jurisdictions.
McElroy andMahoney (1999) explain how being
small, autonomous yet non-sovereign grants sub-
stantial economic advantages to island units. These
beneﬁts include: free trade with, and export prefer-
ence from, the parent country; social welfare assis-
tance; ready access to external capital through
special tax concessions; availability of external la-
bour markets through migration; aid-ﬁnanced
infrastructure and communications; higher quality
health and educational systems; natural disaster re-
lief; provision of costly external defence. Autonomy
without sovereignty also does not hinder the devel-
opmentofﬂourishingtourismeconomiesoroﬀshore
ﬁnance regimes, and may actually facilitate them
because of easier terms of access and security. Most
of these special conditions have emerged in the con-
text of a history of a relatively benign colonial rela-
tionship—typically one that was dominated by
strategic rather than economically exploitative
interests.
Many small islands, because they are islands,
enjoy some degree of administrative autonomy; a
condition that facilitates an eventual move to
sovereign statehood. Furthermore, because they
are also small and somewhat isolated, and
irrespective of independence, such island jurisdic-
tions usually manage to extract some special
advantages from the respective metropole. Since
they have refrained from sovereignty, then they
would typically therefore, jurisdictionally or
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constitutionally, enjoy more discretionary powers
than any similarly sized or even larger chunks of
the ‘‘mainland’’ (Poirine, 1998). Royle (1989)
identiﬁes 41 populated territories who have over-
seas territory, associated status, compact of free
association or some other special, separate
arrangement with a larger state; four of these are
fully-ﬂedged departments of France. Fagerl-
und (1997) describes the four autonomous Euro-
pean island regions—Faroes, A˚land, Isle of Man
and Channel Islands—which enjoy a special rela-
tionship, this time with that supra-national state of
sorts, the European Union. Thus, the indepen-
dence candle for islands has been snuﬀed, at least
for the moment: the current status is seen as the
best of both worlds—providing many of the ben-
eﬁts associated with political sovereignty while
delegating responsibilities to, enjoying the security
and reaping the material beneﬁts of remaining in
association with a larger, and typically richer, pa-
tron.
Meanwhile, national identity remains one of the
most powerful forces in modern history, and at the
root of much civil strife and violence. Neverthe-
less, sovereignty and self-determination do not
appear to be—at least, for now—the obvious tra-
jectory of peoples who see themselves as dispos-
sessed political entities or at the losing end of
federalist developments (Trompf, 1993, p. xxv).
The articulation of nationalism has becomes
jurisdictional but not sovereigntist.
These observations suggest that the small, insu-
lar peripheries of the world today have developed a
particular set of strategies in order to maximise
their options in an increasingly globalised, knowl-
edge-driven and (by implication) metropolitan
world. Some have obtained, by default or design,
full political independence; but the desire for sov-
ereignty has been tempered by more pragmatic
considerations in recent times. Only one new small
sovereign state—East Timor—has emerged on the
world stage in the last 12 years, and this in very
particular circumstances. Meanwhile, enhanced
jurisdictional clout is more often pursued and
secured within the context of a larger polity.
Colonialism has been the main explanatory
variable behind both small island autonomy and
small state sovereignty. As colonisation retreated
post-1945, it left in its wake small puddles of
jurisdiction, with the largest territories generally
obtaining sovereignty ﬁrst (starting with the largest
of all, India, in 1947) and the smallest territories
obtaining sovereignty last—but with the really very
smallest stubbornly refusing to budge (Baldacchi-
no, 2004, p. 79). Insularity, isolation and small size
provide the geographical (if not also the adminis-
trative, logistic, cultural and historical) properties
to render the existence of such jurisdictional
pockets, whether sovereign or merely autonomous,
much more likely.
Conversely expressed, unless a territory has
enjoyed separate status within a colonial relation-
ship, such a territory appears most unlikely to have
the basic political raw material which could (even-
tually) be nurtured into a sovereign state, or even a
quasi-sovereign one. This situation would have re-
sulted because the administrative boundaries legiti-
mating a distinct political identity were developed
both out of sheer convenience as well as within the
comfort of an internationally and domestically
recognised framework of colonial rule.
Native peoples have also been quite successful
in securing decision-making powers from the
metropole in recent years; all the more so
when they are islanders. This goes for the
Aleutian Islanders (Alaska, USA); the Baﬃn/
Ellesmere Islanders (Canada) and the Torres Strait
Islanders (Australia). Small size of population
base is also likely to facilitate the granting of
‘‘autonomy’’.
In the case of continental states which have
island provinces or regions without a history of a
given, separate colonial boundary, the metropole is
usually careful not to create the circumstances for
any eventual devolution,1 unless exceptionally
obliged to do so under force majeure: witness recent
overtures to Corsica by the centralised French
state, in the wake of violence and strong moves for
separatism. Such a strategy could be undertaken,
for example, by deliberately avoiding the crea-
tion of exclusively island-based administrative or
political units, ensuring that geographic ‘‘island
regions’’ are incorporated within larger sub-
national regions2; or else are themselves broken
down into smaller, sub-national units: as happens
in large archipelagic states like the Philippines and
Indonesia. Opportunism may create historical
conjunctures that facilitate such a withdrawal of
autonomy; and the availability of priced resources
may provide the material pretext to do so.3
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3. The distinctive politics of the small
Meanwhile, failing the colonial card, island
regions must rely on alternative strategies to
circumvent and extract discretionary powers from
the local/central state.
One way of so doing is to use and exploit the
existence of a supra-national institution. This
could be seen to be an outcome of the islands’
lobby within the European Union, which has now
identiﬁed no less than 286 island regions as the
targets of ‘‘speciﬁc measures’’ since the adoption
of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Planistat Europe,
2003). The sheer act of being deﬁned and recog-
nized as an ‘‘island region’’ could, in itself, be seen
to represent an, albeit tokenistic, political victory
of sorts. Of course, one could argue that such
initiatives actually conspire to consolidate—rather
then erode—the dependency of such island re-
gions; and that a high political price could even-
tually be paid in exchange for any transfer of funds
from Brussels resulting from such recognition.
However, it isbecoming increasinglyclear thatthe
leap-frogging of national governments by sub-
national units does not necessarily depend on the
existence of supra-national institutions. While the
European Union serves that purpose on the small
and fractious European continent, it is other states
(U.S.A., Japan, eventuallyChina and India?) aswell
as other cities (Boston, NewYork, London, Tokyo,
eventually Beijing and New Delhi?) which are
recognisedas the choicenodeswithwhich todevelop
proﬁtable economic integration networks. The
existing (residual and neo-colonial) links that many
small islands have hadwith such nodes have become
transformed into priceless, fortuitous gates, guar-
anteeing privileged access to key knowledge, ﬁscal
and product markets (Royle, 1989). In these in-
stances, the knowledge/information revolution is
riding on extant political conditions and cementing
their persistence.
A second device deployed by small islands as a
bargaining chip is to use the management of spe-
ciﬁc local resources desired by the central sta-
te—oil, gas, mineral deposits, ﬁshing zones,
strategic bases, tourism potential, or sheer political
loyalty—as leverage by a sub-national unit for
extracting some degree of policy autonomy.4
Yet, even here, natural resource endowment is
not as crucial a factor as is often assumed. The
development and/or attraction of suitable human
capital is the policy priority for many small island
territories today, and especially so in the majority
of cases where there is no natural resource base
available to contemplate an economic alternative.
Indeed, in line with the ‘‘dutch disease’’ hypothesis
(Benjamin et al., 1989), it is not surprising to
ﬁnd that natural resource endowment acts as a
‘‘curse’’, preventing a jurisdiction from embracing
the knowledge economy route (Sachs and Warner,
1995). With many small islands being naturally
resource-poor, they have, simply—and luck-
ily?—had no choice but to adopt emigration as an
economic strategy and see themselves transformed
into MIRAB—migration, remittances, aid and
bureaucracy—economies (Bertram and Watters,
1985; King and Connell, 1999). Here, the charac-
teristic emphasis on a brain or skill drain (e.g.,
McKee and Tisdell, 1990, pp. 78–89) is giving way
to a rotational and cyclical human capital model
(e.g. Henry, 1990; The Economist, 2003b), which
encourages indigenous high-ﬂyers to study or
work abroad—preferably in the human capital
metropole—and then lures them back home in
suitable positions which allow them to act as nodes
in their own right, exploiting and managing their
overseas networks and contacts, and with suitable
opportunities to act comfortably as ‘‘glocal’’ citi-
zens (after Robertson, 1994). In many small island
jurisdictions, the absence of local higher education
institutions served to attract scholarships to and
from overseas universities for the locally gifted.5
The metropolitan intellectual heartland, even
though remote, can still be tapped and exploited
for local ends.
A third, more radical, way is to embark uni-
laterally on a style of ‘‘rogue politics’’ which may
set an island region on a confrontational path with
a central government but where critical local
public opinion may be swayed (also with the
strategic involvement and considerable swaying
inﬂuence of the mass media) in favour of the lurch
and thus act to legitimate it democratically, if not
legally or constitutionally. Whether such politics
are indeed ‘‘maverick’’ is probably a matter of
interpretation; however, they have been more
likely to be adopted by island regions that were
fully sovereign and could therefore rely on the
momentum or ‘‘extantism’’ that sovereignty pro-
vides, in their confrontation with other, larger
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powers (Bartmann, 2002). Examples that come to
mind include Iceland and the ‘‘cod wars’’ with
Britain in the mid-20th century; Malta’s negotia-
tions with the U.K. over the military facilities on
the island in the 1970s; and Vanuatu and Solomon
Islands’ drives for a nuclear-free Paciﬁc in the
1980s (The Economist, 1971; Wriggins, 1976;
Trompf, 1993, pp. xv–xvi, respectively). Non-
sovereign regions may not enjoy the status which
sovereignty provides; but they certainly can and
have threatened full sovereignty if their demands
for an increased localisation of economic power
are not met.6
Note again that, in all the three routes identiﬁed
above, smallness of population and/or land area,
isolation and islandness can be deployed by the
political leadership to act in concert, fuelling a
distinctive territorial politics and seeking to safe-
guard and diﬀerentiate it from external ‘‘inter-
vention’’. These departures are not exceptional: it
would be wiser to see them as examples of the
carving out of political niches where geography
facilitates, while at the same time circumscribes,
the territorial scope of any achieved/granted
powers and privileges. More than that, these are
also examples of alterations in geo-economic
space: as economic power is transferred ‘‘upward,
downward and outward from nation states’’
(Courchene, 1995, p. 3), jurisdiction is increasingly
recognised as a very useful driver and primer for
such purposes; it becomes the ‘‘catapult’’ which
allows the entertaining of diﬀerentiation within the
local state, as well as of developing an interna-
tional (or better, an ultra-national) presence on the
global or regional stage (e.g., McKercher, 2000).
The beneﬁts resulting from the extraction and
deployment of jurisdictional power cannot be
over-estimated (Baldacchino and Milne, 2000).
They usually translate in a larger localisation of
control over economic and political decisions. Of
course, the apex of jurisdictional powers—powers
far greater in relation to the small size of a land
mass or resident population—has been achieved
and assiduously cultivated especially by sovereign
small island states. Fisheries policy by Iceland;
banking policy by Luxembourg and Liechtenstein;
sustainable tourism policy by the Maldives and the
Seychelles; a globally competitive textile and gar-
ments industry in Mauritius. But the political
economy of success is even clearer amongst
non-sovereign island territories. Discretion over
taxation and oﬀshore ﬁnance has been behind the
success of such territories as Madeira, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos, the Isle
of Man and the Channel Islands; discretion over
language policy, shipping registration and prop-
erty ownership lie at the heart of the Aland
Islands autonomy from Finland; some jurisdic-
tional autonomy of varying degrees is enjoyed by
island provinces of larger states, in spite of usually
small relative size of land and population
(Barbuda, Gozo, Hong Kong, Nevis, Zanzibar,
the status apparte of Aruba, the de´partements
d’outre mer of France, French Polynesia, New
Caledonia, Svalbard, Hainan, Galapagos, Rapa
Nui, Tasmania, the Balearics, the Canaries, the
Azores...). What we have here is a combination of
free-riding by the smaller, island party in the
context of (deliberate?) oversight by the larger,
metropolitan party, crafting in the outcome some
kind of regulatory legitimacy; while the island
party never foregoing the potential resort to the
metropole, if and when dire straits so determine or
suggest (such as budgetary shortfalls; environ-
mental disasters; over-population; labour surplus
or shortages).7 In this way, they avoid that chronic
vulnerability which is supposed to plague small,
island territories most of all (Briguglio, 1995). A
critical question to ask is whether such departures
from the norm are actually indicators of auton-
omy, or merely manipulations driven and con-
trolled by the central state to its own net advantage,
often without any consultation or power-sharing
arrangements with the island locals?8
The premise is clear: in the hey-day of frenzied
decolonisation, freedom (read sovereignty) was to
be preferred, even if (as it may have turned out to
be since) it become the road to perdition (read
poverty and marginalisation). However, many
small island territories have not taken this path.
They may have been interpreted, at face value, to
prefer comfortable servility to the perils of inde-
pendence in a world of uncertainty (Baldacchino,
1998). But this impression must be corrected: non-
sovereignty is not neo-colonial servility. Rather,
following critical observation, it often is a shrewd
manner of hedging one’s risks, deploying a ﬂexible
and creative diplomacy, adopting free riding (in
such matters as international relations, defence
and security as well as currency issues), slipping
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free or through the nets of regulation and/or cul-
tivating ultra-national economic linkages. All
these measures constitute a skills repertoire that
the small and powerless deploy and, being small,
often get away with. They may also be providing
useful regulatory escape routes for their metro-
politan patrons. Furthermore, the deployment of
such skills tends to command media attention and
attracts sympathy. Such is the character of the
dynamics of unequal dyads. Such is ‘‘the tyranny
of the weak.’’9
What, therefore, may be in store over the next
decades is not so much a ﬂurry of independentist
movements, but attempts by sub-national jurisdic-
tions to carve out policy discretion on a speciﬁc
number of areas, and economic relationships with a
speciﬁc clutchofattractivemetropoles, in their favour.
As the nation-state, already in itself a mythical
construction ofmodernity, ﬁnds itself toobig aswell
as too small to address key political problems (Bell,
1987), the pressures for internal devolution and
internal federalism in the contemporary ‘‘fragme-
grative’’ space (Rosenau, 2003) will increase, just as
the incentive for supra and ultra-national agree-
mentswithotherneighbouringstatesorcomponents
thereof will also. It is likely that, as in the case of
Malta and Mauritius 40 years ago, political sover-
eignty as a fully ﬂedged state will only be seriously
entertained, or threatenedwith somedegree of bluﬀ,
if what is considered a better deal by the smaller
player is absolutelyunacceptable to the larger.10The
same political contest is bound to occur at a supra-
national and regional level, as nations jockey to
maintain policy autonomy while recognising that
‘‘pooled sovereignty’’ is the only way forward to
rendersuchbodiesastheEuropeanUnionevenmore
eﬀective. That the European Union and the euro
exist at all is the outcomeof such a sober assessment.
‘‘Government’’ (meaning decision-making by elec-
ted representatives) thus gives way irrevocably to
‘‘governance’’ (meaning decision-making by a plu-
rality of networked partnerships)—(Rosenau,
2003).
One should therefore not be surprised to ﬁnd
that metropolitan centres are themselves seeking to
develop jurisdictional clout, especially in federal
political systems grounded in multi-level gover-
nance principles. Although they come very late to
the politics of federalism, cities are fast realising
that their ability to act politically is signiﬁcantly
restrained by their ‘‘constitutionlessness’’, as in the
case of Canada (see Courchene, 2003, p. 4). Small
and peripheral, particularly island, territories thus
have this slight edge on the metropole, allowing
the small and peripheral units to exert legitimate
pressure on the central but federal state in favour
of redistributive politics. In marked contrast, in
circumstances (such as the U.S.A.) where cities
have developed a constitutional personality and/or
are in a position to lobby directly with central
governments, they would be keen to thwart, or
even reverse, the ﬂow of any state ‘‘stabilisation’’
programmes.
A second observation concerns the ﬁnancial
dimensions of development. Conventional eco-
nomic statistics rank countries according to gross
national/domestic product or purchasing power
parity standards. Small, often island, territories are
doing exceptionally well on these counts. In their
powerful critique of the alleged structural vulner-
ability of many small (often island) territories,
Armstrong and Read (2002) conclude that smaller
jurisdictions actually perform economically better
than larger states. The citizens of Aruba, Iceland,
Bermuda and French Polynesia are counted
amongst the world’s top ten richest people (The
Economist, 2003a). That three of the above four
territories are non-sovereign states is also insight-
ful. Indeed, comparative research has shown that,
on average, non-sovereign island territories tend to
be richer per capita than sovereign ones (Bertram,
2004). Stopping short of full independence, while
negotiating access to spoils within a larger juris-
dictional framework, appears to pay oﬀ... literally.
But, then: is jurisdictional clout only there for the
purpose of extracting more largesse from the core?
4. Creative political economy
McElroy and Mahoney (1999, p. 35) conclude that
small dependent (read sub-national) island terri-
tories ‘‘...remain unwilling to trade the visible
security, aﬄuence and standard of living of aﬃli-
ation for the less tangible but more costly rewards
of autonomy’’.
Similarly, Bertram (2004, p. 360) writes:
In the new century, the attributes of sovereignty, such
as votes at the United Nations and possession of
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internet domains, may turn out to confer greater
bargaining power than hitherto; but there is no clear
incentive for presently-dependent island territories to
seek independence, and good grounds for them to
hold to the status quo.
While these observations highlight the pragmatic,
often ﬁnancial, basis for such a political stance, it
underestimates the economic leverage that auton-
omy could grant, apart from other non-monetary,
‘‘status goods’’ like identity, pride, international
clout and self-respect. However, autonomy is not
to be necessarily translated as sovereignty.
Human nature being messy and complex, it is
also possible to come across a scenario with
opposite ‘‘cause-eﬀect’’ dynamics: meaning that an
enhanced economic prowess and business success
in/by a peripheral island can nurture such socio-
cultural conditions which eventually lead to
demands for greater autonomy.11
Armstrong and Read (1998, p. 13) have argued
that many very small states, most of which are
island or archipelagic territories, have managed to
compensate eﬀectively for their small size by a
high quality of ‘‘endogenous policy formulation
and implementation’’. They also contend that
‘‘further investigation of the policy stance of suc-
cessful micro-states, particularly in the sphere of
international political economy, is likely to be
fruitful’’ (ibid.; my emphasis). Earlier, Katzenstein
(1985) had made similar remarks in relation to
small European states. This paper invites an exten-
sion of these observations to sub-national consider-
ations. International political economy becomes
domestic politics in the case of sub-national units, and
falls within federalist studies where sub-national
jurisdictions exist constitutionally or legally.
Sub-national considerations also connect read-
ily with regional studies. Economic regions (e.g.,
Friedmann and Alonso, 1995); industrial districts
(e.g., Piore and Sabel, 1984) or economic clusters
(e.g., Krugman, 1991; Porter, 1998) now ﬁgure
regularly in debates on economic strategy. Small
nation (mainly island) states share many similari-
ties with sub-national regions in terms of imple-
menting strategies for economic development (e.g.,
Armstrong and Read, 2003); but sub-national,
island jurisdictions have an even greater aﬃnity
with regions, being often seen as regions them-
selves. Here, islands have been leading the way as
frontline zones and pioneers in a number of policy
ﬁelds. These include the devolution or extraction
of speciﬁc policy autonomy from ‘‘core’’ powers,
often in the context of deals which are mutually
advantageous; development of cross-border
governance models by means of ultra-national
links with ‘‘adjacent regions’’ (e.g., Armstrong and
Read, 2000); and managing these often, but not
necessarily, within unequal federalist arrange-
ments12. The desirable option today appears to be
that of achieving some jurisdictional autonomy for
territories which lack it; but not to proceed to full
sovereignty as if that were some kind of natural
course of things.
The nurturing and ﬂexing of jurisdictional mus-
cle,de jureorde facto, isboundtobeabasic featureof
an increasingly integrated world. Central govern-
ments ﬁnd themselves incapable of stopping this
concentrationofeconomicandtechnologicalpower,
and must brace themselves for the claims for corre-
sponding political discretion, and matching claims
for the devolution of governance, that are bound to
follow.
It may appear contradictory, even paradoxical,
that such machinations will be entertained and
deployed in the face of rampant globalisation and
the ever increasing interconnectedness of people
and places. This observation, however, should not
come as a surprise to anyone except those who
consider globalisation as a deterministic, uni-
dimensional feature. Almost a century ago, Weber
(1914) had already advised that economy and
society need not follow the same laws of motion:
opportunities for maximising growth and devel-
opment may be struck via convergent liberalisa-
tion on the economic front, where free trade is
deemed beneﬁcial; but then political deals are
struck where free trade is not perceived as one’s
best option. Polanyi (1944) had similarly criticised
economic neo-liberalism, arguing that this does not
just ‘‘happen’’ but follows from deliberate public
policy. Small island jurisdictions demonstrate how
creative politics can compensate for demographic,
economic and more recently, ‘knowledge poverty’.
Cities are waking up to this strategy.
5. Insights for/from the knowledge-based economy
Sovereignty gives way to autonomy; government
gives way to governance; big gives way to small...
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interesting dynamics in the context of globalisa-
tion which, at face value, suggests the exact
opposite.
The increasing and unstoppable interconnec-
tedness of the world facilitates the understanding
of (themselves globalizing) markets; in so doing it
incentivizes the resort to techniques which may
distort the market to one’s advantage. Politics is
the instrument to exploit economics. Federalisa-
tion is proposed in this paper as one such powerful
political response to economic opportunities.
Information and communication technologies, in
the manner in which they connect nodes to nodes
in stubborn deﬁance of national borders, invite a
decoupling away from the conventional view of
the world in terms of, literally, inter-national
trade, and towards the internationalisation of sub-
national units.
Cities and/or regions are the often-cited exam-
ples; but small islands are prototype peripheral re-
gions which can be singled out as the sites of
‘‘innovative treatment’’ within the new political
economy of development. Historically, they were
already seen as suitable locations for such pioneer-
ing initiatives as fortress or plantation economics
(e.g., Landes, 1999). Today, they are often looked
upon as relics of the past, since it is no longer an
option—either for places or for ﬁrms—to survive as
isolates. But the islands of the real world are any-
thing but self-suﬃcient. They are by deﬁnition open
economies and their survival strategies are inti-
mately connected with the ability to source and
obtain income, transfers and ‘‘rents’’ (Connell,
1998; Kakazu, 1994) from beyond their shores.
Small islands may be looked upon as political
innovators of the information age, testing out the
limits of possibility which insularity, small size,
location, and a measure of administrative auton-
omy may oﬀer... though not without the threat that
big cities may cheat them of their prized political
capacities.
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Notes
1. As in the reaction by Copenhagen to Bornholm’s desire
for more autonomy.
2. Such as the Western Islands of Scotland which form
administrative units with parts of the mainland (Skye and
Lochalsh; Argyll and Bute); or the Dutch, Danish, Finnish,
German, Irish and Swedish Islands. Is Newfoundland and
Labrador a similar conﬁguration?
3. As happened in the case of Cape Breton Island (now part
of the Province of Nova Scotia, in Canada). Another example is
that of the proposed granting of independence to St Kitts-
Nevis-Anguilla in the late 1960s. This was used by Bradshaw,
then Premier of St Kitts, to tighten central control by St Kitts
over the archipelago—leading to the secession of Anguilla and
its persisting status as a separate British colony.
4. Such cases include: the issue of oil and gas reserves in the
discussions over the potential secession of the Faroe Islands
from the Danish realm, as well as on the status of the Falkland
Islands (because of oil); the granting by Westminster of special
tax-raising powers related to North Sea oil/gas to the Shetland
Islands; the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda (because of
oﬀshore banking) under the British Crown; India’s relationship
with the Andaman and Nicobar Islands—seen as having strong
tourism potential; and the use of Kwalajein Atoll by the U.S.
Military within the agreement of a Compact of Free Associa-
tion between the Marshall Islands and the U.S.A. The
cultivation of political loyalty explains most of Gozo’s admin-
istrative autonomy within the Maltese state. Cullen (1990) also
explores the diﬀerent ways in which Australia and Canada
handled the management of natural resources within their sub-
national jurisdictions.
5. As was the case, for example, in Cyprus before Hellenic
nationalism got the better of public policy.
6. Non-island examples of this in recent years have been
Que´bec in Canada as well as Catalonia and Euskadi/Basque
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Region (using sharply contrasting methods) in Spain. Mean-
while, A˚land, Bermuda and the Isle of Man have all spawned
independist movements in recent years when speciﬁc economic
privileges have appeared to be under threat.
7. My thanks to Jerome L. McElroy for developing this
argument.
8. Thus Royle (1997) describes the development of Batam
Island as an exclusive economic zone within Indonesia, in order
to exploit its proximity to Singapore. But this move was done
uniltareally by Jakarta and may have intensiﬁed the power-
lessness of the Batanese.
9. An expression coined by former President of Iceland,
Olafur Ragnar Grimsson.
10. In their run-up to eventual independence, both Malta and
Mauritius opted ﬁrst to seek integration within the British state.
11. A current condition of Newfoundlanders, especially those
engaged in the extraction (oil/gas) industries? (I am grateful to
Mark Shrimpton for this observation).
12. For a comparative assessment of contemporary federalist
arrangements aﬀecting islands, see Watts (2000).
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